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1992  
Executive Research Project  
A71

# Integrating AF Services and MWR Organizations: Impacts, Assessments, and Recommendations

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93-06287



DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT  
Approved for public release  
Distribution Unlimited

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY N/A		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE N/A		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) Same	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) NDU-ICAF-92- A71		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION National Defense University	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Industrial College of the Armed Forces		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable) ICAF-FAP	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, D.C. 20319-6000		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, D.C. 20319-6000	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) <i>Integrating AF Services and AWR Organizations: Imports, Assessments, and Recommendations</i>			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) <i>Gary Bradham</i>			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Research		13b. TIME COVERED FROM <i>Aug 91</i> TO <i>Apr 92</i>	
		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) April 92	
		15. PAGE COUNT 70	
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)			
SEE ATTACHED			
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Judy Clark		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (202) 475-1889	
		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL ICAF-FAP	

A-11

## ABSTRACT

**BRADHAM, GARY C., LT COL, USAF** (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Ft McNair, Washington, DC) **Integrating AF Services and MWR Organizations: Impacts, Assessments, and Recommendations. *Organizational Structure*, 1992.** -Investigates the decision to integrate the Air Force's Services and MWR organizations by reviewing the history of both organizations and the background leading up to the decision by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to integrate the organizations. Assesses the impact of the integration on readiness, personnel development, and customer service. Findings indicate the readiness posture of both organizations will be enhanced; the integration provides a stronger organizational team with clear career paths for all; and the quality of customer service will be improved. Furthermore, recommendations are made which will further enhance the integration.

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Accession For	
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REF ID: A71 1992 1

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# INTEGRATING AF SERVICES AND MWR ORGANIZATIONS: IMPACTS, ASSESSMENTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## Chapter One

### INTRODUCTION

On October 3, 1991, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) released the decisions of a September 27, 1991 Objective Wing Conference concerning the Services and Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) organizations. "MWR and Services will merge into one squadron. Tests underway for separate squadrons may continue for a limited time with integration the objective. Air Staff MWR and Services functions will integrate immediately. MAJCOM Headquarters functions will integrate by 1 January 1992. Integrated MWR/Services squadrons should be activated during the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 1992 once MWR business/financial systems are formulated." (1:4)

How an organization is structured is key to its success and long term survival. The organizational structure is the framework within which customer service and outputs are achieved. (2:65) Albert Wicksberg, in his book, Management Organization, describes organizational structure as a "set of relationships between and among individuals and groups" which allow it to "operate in the context of positions, procedure, process, technology, and social environment." (3:5) In other words, the structure itself is key to improving efficiencies and delivering a high quality product. The purpose of this research paper is to assess the impact of the recent organizational structure change announced by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force to integrate the Services and the Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) career fields into a

single organization -- an action which had been studied several times since 1976 but rejected for various reasons.

Need:

The Air Force recently assessed its structure for providing "Global Reach - Global Power" (speed, range, flexibility, precision and lethality) to the national security strategy to match the changes taking place in the world and the call for a smaller, more mobile military force. According to the Air Force's white paper on Air Force Restructure, "restructuring is a logical way to improve combat capability and increase peacetime effectiveness." (4:2) Restructuring decisions were based upon five criteria -- (1) strengthening chain of command; (2) decentralizing; (3) consolidating under a single field commander; (4) removing layers by streamlining and flattening organizations; (5) untangling organizational lines to provide clarity. (5:2-3) As part of this restructuring, the Secretary of the Air Force, Donald B. Rice, charged each organization to measure itself against its ability to contribute to Global Reach - Global Power and to perform this measurement in the context of increasing combat power and applying modern management principles -- delayering, streamlining, consolidating, divesting, and pushing power and responsibilities to the lowest level. (6:1)

Purpose:

This paper will review the history of the Services and MWR career fields and the background leading up to the announced change to integrate them into one new organization. In addition, it will assess the impact of the



integration by determining:

- If the readiness posture is enhanced.
- If the integration provides a stronger organizational team?
- If the quality of customer service has been improved.

Finally, this paper will provide recommendations to further enhance the integration.

Since this action had been studied repeatedly since 1976 with negative results, why was this the right time to integrate the functional areas? A look at the recent history, as a background to the new organization, may hold the answers.

## CHAPTER TWO

### BACKGROUND

#### Why change?

The world is going through some fast paced changes which affect the Air Force's structure. The threat is changing -- we no longer need to posture against a massive Soviet strike across the borders of Europe -- thus reducing Services and MWR wartime requirements. Political situations are changing, the Berlin Wall has fallen and communism has failed, resulting in overseas bases closing with forces and weapon systems returning home. President Bush announced the elimination of many ground-launched tactical nuclear weapon systems, dismantling of many ICBM missile systems, and the reduction of various aircraft systems from the Air Force's inventory -- thus reducing Services and MWR support requirements.

From an economic viewpoint, the budget is declining and the Air Force can't afford the same troop levels as in the past. According to the CSAF, General Merrill McPeak, in his speech presented to the Air Force National Symposium in Los Angeles, California, "The Air Force will be smaller -- probably about 25 percent smaller. Our budget this year, in real terms, is about the same size it was in 1981, near the beginning of the Reagan buildup. And, our budget projections show nothing but decline." (7:--) The smaller budget coupled with the changed threat also drove reductions in the CONUS basing requirements and many installations are targeted to close over the next

five years.

But the Services and MWR functions and responsibilities aren't declining. In fact under the Air Force's Global Reach-Global Power, their missions play a key role in projecting and supporting airpower -- as demonstrated during the Gulf war. In this type of environment (reduced budgets and changed threat) a restructuring of the Services and MWR functional areas appears to be right on target. But does it make sense to merge these two areas?

### History

At the Air Staff level, there were entangled organizational lines for both MWR and Services. MWR fell under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel while Services fell under the Air Force Civil Engineer. However, at the base level, all four functions (MWR, Personnel, Services, and Civil Engineering) were separate and equal functions working for the Support Group Commander. This made things confusing for the commander when he needed headquarters assistance -- the Civil Engineer made policy for Services and the Chief of Personnel made policy for MWR. The organizational charts at appendix A show how both organizations are currently organized, the entangled organizational alignments, and the new structure announced at the September 27, 1991 Objective Wing Conference.

The MWR function was formed in 1947 and was placed under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel where it had remained over the years until 1991 when it was moved out and placed directly under the CSAF (the reasoning for this will be discussed later in the paper). (11:--) During these years, the function was never integrated into the personnel structure -- MWR staffs had

separate career paths and different training needs and programs.

Eventually, it was decided to eliminate military officers from the MWR career field and to replace them with all civilian managers. In addition, it was decided to sparsely place enlisted people throughout the organization in areas with wartime requirements to provide the capability for MWR to respond to those wartime requirements.

From the formation of the Air Force until 1974, the responsibility for Services function was assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics with air staff duties (policy and oversight) actually handled by Air Force Material Command and later Air Force Logistics Command. In 1974, the Air Force approved an organizational change to align Services with Civil Engineering to allow focus and emphasis on improving facilities and service for people vice the emphasis of Logistics on supporting the flying squadrons' missions. The Air Staff function was moved to Washington under the Director of Engineering and Services with MAJCOM and field support provided by the Air Force Engineering and Services Center which was established in June 1978 at Tyndall AFB, Florida. (12:2-3)

This structure served the Services Community well as it improved dealings with the MAJCOMs and gave services personnel a sense of belonging. Higher grades were obtained at both the Air Staff and base level, and squadrons were introduced into the base structure in the early 1980s. The primary leadership role fell to the military with squadron commanders reporting directly to the Combat Support Group Commander -- thus strong base level chain of command ties were developed. Base level services' personnel worked with the Civil Engineer at MAJCOM and Air Staff levels for policy and guidance. Some felt this line of activity was confusing to base level senior

leaders and mis-aligned with engineering from a policy standpoint. (13:--)

To resolve this policy and oversight confusion and to provide a central point for base commanders for various types of services interface, the merger of MWR and Services was considered several times in the past. In 1976, the Base Management Action Group at the Pentagon proposed a merger of the career fields. After considerable discussion, the proposal was not implemented because MAJCOM and Air Staff functional areas were not supportive for political reasons. In 1978, the Strategic Air Command proposed a merger for SAC bases only but the proposal wasn't implemented due to lack of support by Headquarters Air Force Manpower and Personnel -- status quo was more acceptable. The merger was studied again in 1986 after an Air Force Military Personnel Center functional review was performed by an ad hoc committee with Air Staff and MAJCOM representation. The committee didn't recommend the merger due to the strong opposition from field commanders. Their concerns were based upon the low grade structure of base services squadrons and divisions, the large span of control, and the lack of perceived value added benefits. (14:--)

What's different now than during the seventies and eighties which should result in a merger of these two areas? The nineties brought in a magnitude of change making this a time when change was readily accepted.

#### Why merge?

The first step towards this determination was a review of responsibilities and functions with an eye towards potential integration points -- possible consolidations and efficiencies. The review consisted of looking at the various missions of both organizations, the targeted customers for each mission, and the type of labor force (military, appropriated fund

civilians, or nonappropriated fund civilians) used to perform the missions. Services provides the essential life-sustaining services to Air Force members and their families such as food service, billeting, clothing, and mortuary affairs. MWR provides the leisure-time morale sustaining services such as clubs, recreation activities, child care, youth programs, and physical fitness programs. If the roles are clearly distinct, why should they integrate? (8:1)

The review found many similar functions performed by both and that a tremendous amount of linkage existed between the two organizations. First, both have critical wartime troop support missions needed to project and sustain airpower. Second, both have an overriding dedication to provide quality customer service. The degree of success of both organizations contributes to the retention, morale, and recruitment of Air Force people. Third, like Services, MWR involves a large number of real property facilities to manage and maintain (averages 56 per base for MWR compared to 44 per base for Services) and they are engaged in a wide variety of activities supporting a diverse group of customers -- active duty military, families, and civilian personnel. Fourth, both use varying funding alternatives (ie., appropriated funds, nonappropriated funds, or a mixture of each type of funds) to achieve program goals. The chart at appendix B outlines the funding sources for each activity within both organizations. Although their income thrusts are different, with the majority of Services activities being expense oriented while MWR is revenue generating, they both require managers with business administration skills. Fifth, a significant portion of their business is centered around food service support -- providing strong ties to food management. Sixth, each requires extensive supply discipline with varying equipment needs (ie, cafeteria, lounge, living facility, and feeding

equipment). Finally, both functions manage a mix of military, civil service, and nonappropriated funded personnel. (9:1)

This review of activities highlighted many potential integration points. Duplication appeared in financial management and budgeting activities. Supply functions such as furnishings, recreation supply, organizational supply and linen exchange activities were also repetitive. Food management of dining facilities, clubs, and snack bars as well as demand for Defense Commissary Service needs overlapped. And finally, manpower, personnel, and training requirements were identical. (10:2) These integration points, as well as the chain of command issues and entangled organizational lines, complied with the established Air Force restructuring criteria which was outlined in chapter one -- thus establishing the need for integration.

#### What caused the integration?

In addition to the restructuring issues previously discussed which led to the integration of Services (SVS) and MWR, the MWR career field was undergoing an extensive reorganization in 1990 aimed at strengthening oversight of the program. (15:--) This effort, although consistent with the goals of the Air Force restructuring, was geared to correct the deficiencies identified during past detailed audits and to satisfy concerns of Congress. (16:--) The reorganization started in 1987 with the appointment of an MWR task force directed by the CSAF to look into criticisms raised by the House Armed Service Committee (HASC) on funding irregularities. As a result of this task force, fifty one recommendations were presented. They centered around organizational changes, personnel issues, training and marketing problems, and basic business orientation deficiencies. As a result, a new funding

philosophy was devised which placed new restrictions on funding support by different categories upon varying MWR activities. (17:--)

Deficiencies continued as problems were uncovered in the Ramstein Air Base, Germany club operation and improper construction funding projects were completed. The HASC directed a DOD IG review of MWR activity management irregularities. Additionally, the HASC directed hearings to be held in November 1989 to review procedures. As a result, the HASC directed the Air Force to strengthen the procedures for control of the construction process and develop a management information system. They also called for the establishment of financial standards and increased Secretarial involvement. (18:--)

The HASC hearings triggered the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) to direct a 32 base audit to be completed by May 1990. The audit had the following conclusions:

- Oversight system was not working;
- Reporting/accounting system was deficient;
- Commander autonomy seen as a contributing factor.

The fix involved procedural, organizational, and attitudinal changes. The SECAF established an MWR Steering Group consisting of functional, financial, and installation representatives at both the Secretariat and Air Staff level. (19:--) Their work laid the framework for change which took place in February 1991.

The policy, oversight, and administration was assigned to a Director of MWR in Washington who reported directly to the CSAF. A subordinate Field Operating Agency at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, was given responsibility for operations. MAJCOM MWR activities were realigned from personnel to the command section under the Commander. The thrust of these changes was to move



towards a more businesslike operation within the laws and rules established by Congress. In July 1991, the SECAF/CSAF stated in a combined memorandum to all MAJCOM commanders that "Commanders are in the best position to know the needs of their communities and run programs to address those needs. Along with this goes the responsibility to run MWR within the bounds of the law and governing directives ... I expect commanders at all levels to operate within the spirit and intent of the law and established rules. Those who do not will be held accountable." (20:--) This was all in an effort to rebuild the confidence of Congress and avoid the perceived abuses of the past. Services on the other hand had established itself as a high impact, customer oriented community. Under the guidance of the Engineer, the Services community made major strides in improving the service and facilities provided. The leadership was considered strong with most of the senior leaders growing up in the Services business.

#### What changed?

As a result of the past problems within MWR and the need to restructure the Air Force, the decision was made to integrate the two functions at all command levels. At the base level, Services and MWR worked independently for the Combat Support Group Commander -- Services as a squadron and MWR as a division. A typical Services organization is about 100 strong with an additional 50 manyears of contractor work within the organization. MWR is about 200 strong with eighty percent of the people being nonappropriated funded employees. The Services organization is led by military (94 squadron commanders, 26 military division chiefs, and one civilian division chief) while MWR is predominantly civilian led (77 civilian division chiefs and 43

military division chiefs). (21:--) Under the restructure, the base level organization is a combined squadron with one commander working directly for the Support Group Commander. Normally within a squadron the commander is military, although some situations may dictate a civilian at the head of the squadron with the commander duties falling to the military deputy.

As a result of consolidating many of the integration points discussed earlier, current estimates show this MWR/SVS restructure will save over 1100 appropriated positions and 1200 nonappropriated positions -- about a seven percent reduction in appropriated positions.(22:--) A complete manpower study is being conducted to determine the exact savings which will factor in Air Force worldwide reductions as well.

At the MAJCOM and Air Staff level, Services is realigned from the Air Force Civil Engineer to the MWR "stand alone" organization working for the MAJCOM commander and CSAF respectively. Housing property management functions such as the dormitory management function and furnishings management function previously performed by the services community will remain in civil engineering. They will combine with the military family housing management functions resulting in one organization responsible for permanent party personnel housing and property management.

#### Summary:

The new MWR/Services organization has two primary objectives. The first is to provide maximum combat capability to the Air Force's "Global Reach-Global Power" mission. The second and equally important is to provide the best possible service to the customers they support. (23:--) From these two primary objectives comes the vision of the new integrated organization --to

provide a wide range of quality food, lodging and recreation services and programs in support of aerospace power. (24:--)

The measures of merit of this restructure like the total Air Force restructure are whether or not it enhances combat capability and improves peacetime efficiency. (25:--) According to the SECAF, we must respond rapidly to future contingencies and we must be structured for reliability and responsiveness to our customers -- we must be a "Quality Air Force." (26:11) The next three chapters will assess the impact of the integration against these established criteria -- enhanced readiness, stronger organizational team, and improved quality service.

### Chapter Three

#### ENHANCED READINESS

The first measure of merit which must be met for this integration to be considered successful is enhanced combat capability. To determine if combat capability is enhanced, the new organization will be assessed against four prominent factors. First, the changes should contribute to the Air Force's global reach and global power mission. Second, it should result in better, more realistic training for all involved. Third, it should balance, as much as possible, the wartime requirements to peacetime manning (active duty, reserve, and national guard) assets. And finally, it should provide adequate support for CONUS sustaining forces. (27:--)

Before we can assess the impact of the new structure on readiness, we must first look at the current readiness situation of both organizations.

#### Current Services situation:

The Services organization provides high impact wartime needs and basic survival products (food, shelter, clothing, and care of the dead) to commanders during times of hostilities. Not only are these products required to maintain morale of the troops in a critical situation, but they are necessary to sustain life. Failure to provide these essential services can impair mission effectiveness and in some cases actually render fighting forces helpless as was the case in the Philippines when General MacArthur's troops

were forced to withdraw.

"Although many factors contributed to force the withdrawal, the primary reason was a lack of food. American and Philippine troops, exhausted and sick from malnutrition, became incapable of defending their positions." (28:28)

According to the current Air Force regulation, the Services organization's wartime mission is to deploy and provide the necessary support to beddown and sustain combat forces thus sustaining combat capability. (29:2) This mission was successfully implemented during the recent Gulf war -- 61,400 Air Force people were billeted in tents and contract hotels; 61,400 Air Force people and 9,000 Army personnel were supported with food service from field kitchens; mortuary operations were established in the Area of Responsibility (AOR); and the Dover Port Mortuary was activated on a twenty four-hour basis. At the height of hostilities, Services had 1,450 personnel deployed to the AOR. (30:--)

Current MWR situation:

Similarly, the MWR organization is tasked to provide critical wartime recreation support to fighting forces in a hostile environment. The MWR readiness program has two primary objectives. First, to provide a variety of programs and activities during wartime and contingencies as local conditions permit. Second, to provide food services operations using overseas open mess facilities as well as in-place and deployed open mess military personnel. (31:2) In areas where no Air Force facilities exist, deployed MWR personnel will use MWR mobility kits to provide fitness, library, social recreation and self-directed programs. In such bare base situations, the success of the MWR program rests on the initiative and imagination of the deployed MWR personnel.

In the recent Gulf war, MWR responded and provided invaluable support to US troops. (32:2) Conditions varied throughout the theater of operations -- some locations had state of the art host-nation provided facilities while other locations used makeshift outdoor theaters and athletic fields. A by-location matrix of host nation, as well as US forces established MWR programs/facilities is at appendix C.

Assessment of Services readiness capabilities:

The ability of Services to respond to wartime situations like Desert Shield/Storm was a direct result of the planning which began in 1975. During the period 1975-1978, Services managers became aware of severe problems in providing Services support in contingency operations. (33:3) Many Services operations, especially food operations, had been contracted to civilian firms, equipment was outdated and military personnel were not trained in the use of this equipment. Services deployed personnel were provided on a "catch as catch can" basis and generally were provided only as an afterthought to the planning process of these contingency operations.

The first major indication of a need to improve contingency operations came during the 1975 Vietnamese refugee camp at Eglin AFB, Florida. Services was not prepared to provide needed support. When Services was merged with the Civil Engineering career field in 1975, Services learned much from the engineers who had been working the readiness initiative hard over the last 7-10 years under their program Prime BEEF. A single air staff focal point was established for all engineering and services readiness issues. (34:5) As a result, the Services readiness program was born -- Prime Readiness in Base Services (RIBS).

Personnel were assigned to Prime RIBS unit type code (UTCs) based upon a building block approach to match requirements of contingency operations and war plans. Equipment was improved and technical experts dictated user requirements in the development of equipment needs. Field training sites were established at Detachment 2, Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency (AFCESA) at Eglin AFB, Florida; Dobbins AFB, Georgia for reserve and guard personnel; and in Europe for training of overseas personnel. Training shot to the forefront as Services leadership realized this was the key to early success in a wartime environment. Field training was included in the technical training established at Lowry AFB, Colorado, and home station training was mandated by the program. (35:4) Training videos were prepared which showed in detail the different requirements for field operations. Services commanders were charged with the responsibility to ensure all deploying personnel were properly trained and exercised prior to contingency operations. As stated by Colonel George Murphy, Vice Commander of the Engineering and Services Center, to a Services Wartime Support Course, "Training is our primary responsibility; not a secondary one. If you can't light the burner (a key piece of wartime equipment), we don't need you".

Services personnel began taking an active part in deployments and contingency training exercises. Units trained together and were tied specifically to the flying squadrons they were to support. At first, Services managers used these exercises to get their people trained. But soon, deployed commanders expected at least 75% of the deployed personnel to already be trained and Services was only sending about 10 percent. The training percentages quickly changed as home station training took hold. (36,48) Also, Services people trained for their wartime tasks during local exercises.

Finally personnel requirements were calculated and shortfalls documented for conversion of civilian authorizations to military authorizations -- thus ensuring sufficient military personnel would be available for future requirements. As a result, the best facilities and services were provided during Desert Shield/Storm and these efforts were noted and commented on by senior DoD and Air Force commanders and leadership during their visits to the AOR and in after action reports. (37:--)

Assessment of MWR readiness capabilities:

Although the MWR readiness program was highly successful during the Gulf war, the MWR program is not nearly as structured as the Services program. It has many of the symptoms that the Services readiness program had in the 1970s -- military conversions to civilian authorizations, lack of realistic training opportunities, no home station training, an "after thought" in contingency planning, and dwindling senior leadership with field support experience (all MWR officers are being converted to civilian managers). (38:appendix 7) The Air Force MWR support during Desert Shield/Storm was superb -- mainly because of the individuals who were deployed to accomplish the tasks, teamwork, and improvisation. (39:4) The key to providing acceptable, reliable levels of support repeatedly in a wartime environment is training. Unfortunately, MWR rarely trains for their wartime requirements. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the outcome of MWR support in future contingencies. The key issue now is to ensure continued mission success for future operations. The new integrated Services and MWR organization will enhance that possibility.



Enhanced readiness capabilities:

Under the new organizational structure, the Services and MWR wartime requirements will be handled by an integrated team deployed as a unified UTC. (40:--) This concept will allow the deploying UTC commander to concentrate additional resources on the problems at hand -- first, to get everyone a place to sleep; next, to set up hot feeding operations; and then, to focus on beginning recreation programs. UTCs will be assigned to specific flying squadrons and a single readiness focal point established to work readiness issues, plan contingencies, and determine resource requirements. Thus, maximum support will be provided to the AF's global reach-global power mission. This will also ensure a robust readiness posture for the future and will deal with several of the "lessons learned" identified in the MWR Desert Shield/Storm after action report (the complete report is at appendix D).

The current Services training structure and field training sites can be used to ensure everyone on the integrated UTC is trained under realistic field conditions. Home station training videos can be updated to include field recreation operations. Various phases of training can be accomplished during local exercises (currently MWR personnel rarely exercise their wartime requirements as they are used as augmentees for other organizations) as is done by the Services personnel. (41:--) Field training should continue with the civil engineers at Tyndall AFB, Florida which will provide the opportunity for realistic training of MWR wartime requirements.

During Desert Storm, many of the sites were manned with MWR enlisted only. The commanders at these sites assigned the MWR function to officers of other areas such as personnel and services to oversee the MWR operations. Because of their lack of training and experience in the MWR arena, these sites

had the most problems in terms of programs offered and internal controls. Training of the new officer cadre of the new organization will solve this problem as well as 5 of the 6 other personnel lessons learned and 6 of the 9 training lessons learned described in the MWR Desert Shield/Storm after action report.

Historically, the Services community has had a significant shortfall in filling the wartime ~~manning~~ requirements. Several initiatives were pursued in the past to reduce this shortfall but without complete success. First, Services positions were designated Critical Military Skills. As civilian positions were vacated in the food service and billeting arenas, they were converted to military authorizations. Next, a major budget issue was presented to the Defense Resources Board (DRB) in 1983 to fund the shortfall. Although the shortfall was accepted, it was never funded. The DRB did fund 878 authorizations for new Air National Guard positions but the shortfall still was quite significant. (42:21) The MWR career field, on the other hand, has 750 more active duty authorizations than needed for their wartime mission. (43:--) By combining the career fields, a major portion of the shortfall can be reduced. In addition, this action will ensure sufficient military personnel for future MWR requirements -- a major concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during the early operations of Desert Shield. (44:appendix 7)

Finally, Desert Shield/Storm uncovered several weaknesses in both organizations' CONUS sustaining programs. In the Services (SV) area, an Air Force Functional Management Inspection of the Engineering and Services CONUS Sustaining Forces was conducted during the timeframe of Desert Shield. Although the report indicated CONUS sustaining forces were highly motivated and successfully accomplished all top priority mission essential requirements,

problems did exist which this integration may fix. First, skilled personnel in six specific areas (overhead, mortuary affairs/readiness NCO, dining hall supervisors, storeroom supervisors, food service accountant, and Services Information Management System (SIMS) administrator) were not available because they were filled with military and deployed with the Prime RIBS teams to Saudi Arabia. As a result, management capabilities were degraded and the units lacked the skills to expand contracts, meet regulatory and economic guidelines, run computer operations, and provide mortuary services such as honor guard teams and funeral details. Absence of knowledgeable food service supervisors resulted in poor variety of food, improper preparation of food items, and mismanagement. (45:--) An integrated MWR/SV functional area would have allowed a crossflow of expertise. In general, Services had a skilled work force but lacked skilled/experienced supervision.

On the other hand, MWR supervisors were present for duty but much of their work force was not, as they were deployed. A large portion of the MWR work force was active duty military who worked after hours in MWR. Others were dependents of active duty members who because of the deployment, were needed at home to handle the affairs of the active duty member who deployed.

Also, many of the services previously required were not required during Desert Shield/Storm because the patrons were deployed. New services to help people cope with the stress and pressures brought on by their sponsors being deployed were required to support the families who were left behind. (46:3) Although these programs were successful, many of the difficulties, due to a lack of work force, may have been resolved if the MWR chief controlled a combined MWR/SV work force.

Summary:

In summary, the integrated Services and MWR organization will enhance the military and combat capabilities of both organizations. The lessons learned during the Engineering and Services merger can be used to strengthen the readiness structure for MWR. Both units will enjoy better, more realistic training. Wartime requirements will be balanced between the organizations. Finally, the CONUS sustaining programs will ensure adequate support for the CONUS forces remaining at home bases during hostilities. The bottomline is that the new organization will contribute to the AF's global reach global power mission with a robust readiness program capable of responding with combat support to any contingency. But are there sufficient career paths for officers, enlisted and civilians to sustain a strong organizational team which can survive in the future Air Force environment?

## Chapter Four

### STRONG ORGANIZATIONAL TEAM

Extremely important in any organization's structure is the ability to develop a strong organizational team to sustain the operations. This is particularly important in an organization which has a wartime mission -- thus contributing to global reach global power. Since both MWR and Services have vital wartime requirements (as discussed in chapter three), it is necessary that any organizational structure for this merged career field allow growth for both military officers and enlisted required to perform these wartime duties. Additionally, efficient organizations, like those required during times of reduced resources and combined operations, call for trained personnel and a viable civilian work force as well. Therefore, the next measure of merit critical to the success of the new integrated MWR and Services organization is whether or not there is a strong team with career paths for all -- officers, enlisted and civilians. Let's first look at the officer force in the current Services and MWR organizations and what that force will look like under the new structure.

#### Officers career development:

Services has over 400 officers in the career field. A strong leadership and management training program is available through the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) School of Engineering and Services. The focus of the

program is on customer service, program management, and financial skills. Services officers have good promotion potential to the grade of colonel (with over twenty colonels who have grown up in the business). A review of past five year promotion potential to field grade ranks has equalled or exceed the line of the Air Force. (47:--) Much of this success is because of the career opportunities in Services. There are 94 squadron commander positions in Services as well as 26 division chief positions. In addition to the officer positions in Services, there are also 37 Defense Commissary Agency (DECA) and Army/Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) career broadening positions available to officers with Services experience. (48:--)

As for MWR, there are 140 officers left in the career field. (49:--) A management decision was made several years ago to convert officer positions to civilian positions as they became vacant. There are only 43 remaining military division chiefs and no MWR squadron commander billets. (50:--) As a result, there is no career progression for MWR officers. Also, MWR officers are awarded the personnel AFSC but their training paths are quite different. As a matter of fact, the training opportunities and educational programs for MWR officers are limited. The Desert Shield/Storm after action report previously discussed documented the potential problems of having no officer positions for future contingencies.

The integrated organization brings new life to the MWR officer corps and new horizons for Services officers. A single agency for services support provides the commander with military officers experienced in all aspects of community support -- life sustaining services and leisure-time morale services. It provides a larger resource of officers experienced and trained to perform wartime needs -- critical in Desert Storm. Finally, it provides

diversity and flexibility to handle changing needs and to provide better job opportunities.

But diversity is only as good as the training program which will ensure flexibility. By continuing the leadership and training courses with the AFIT School of Engineering, the officers will be provided better educational training. The MWR officers will be exposed to a whole new training environment with a focus which will directly impact their business needs. Combined training requirements will ensure a large enough resource to warrant continuing the training effort in this environment of cutbacks. All in all, the new integrated organization provides an enhanced officer career path with a better officer to add to the organizational team.

#### Enlisted career development:

A similar situation as the officers' career field exists for the enlisted career field as well. Services has over 6000 enlisted personnel. (51:--) All accessions receive formal category A training -- technical training from an Air Force Technical Training Center. (52:6) The career field only allows limited reclassified airmen to crossflow into the career field. Technical training is also offered to NCOs as they move into supervisory positions. Enlisted are placed in positions of high responsibility and as a result there is a good career path through the ranks to Chief Master Sergeant. Additionally, there are 890 positions in DECA for which Services enlisted can compete for. (53:--)

The 1600 MWR enlisted don't fare as well. (54:--) There is no accession technical training provided to the MWR enlisted as the career field is considered a category B activity. (55:15) The enlisted career path is poor as

most of the supervisory positions in MWR are civilian positions. Older military personnel tend to perform the same jobs as when they came into the MWR career field, just at larger bases.

The new integrated organization provides the commander with an extremely flexible enlisted force for providing community support. By combining the AFSCs into one AFSC, all accessions, both Services and MWR, would receive category A training. The Services career field recently combined the food service AFSC and the billeting AFSC with the same results. The larger resource base of enlisted members means increased promotion potential under the current Air Force pyramid and Weighted Airmen Promotion System (WAPS) program. Although the career field would be more diverse, the career and training opportunities would far outweigh the downside of diversity especially in this current environment of cutbacks.

#### Civilians career development:

The Services and MWR civilian personnel development situation is just the opposite of the military. Services has 3,225 appropriated funded authorizations, 6,300 nonappropriated authorizations and 6,837 contractor personnel performing services duties. (56:--) There is no clear career path. Most of the civilians' duties are at the working level with few supervisory positions available to civilians. Services career civilian positions are in two different series -- one for food services/overhead and one for billeting. (57:27) Movement between the two series isn't very flexible. Also, billeting civilians do compete in and are included in the military family housing (MFH) career program. However, according to Mr Gary Carter, Chief of Career Programs in AF/DPC, only a handful of Services civilians have ever been



selected to move into MFH supervisory positions -- indicating a sick program.  
(58:--)

The MWR civilian career development program is extremely strong. They have 5,900 appropriated funded civilian authorizations and 22,640 nonappropriated fund (NAF) civilian full-time equivalents. (59:--) There are many different series; however, they all are interrelated and there is career progression built into and between each series. Additionally, in 1991 MWR received legislative approval to interchange appropriated and NAF personnel as they moved from different jobs without losing benefits or status. (60:--) Therefore, NAF personnel can now compete for key upward mobility positions within MWR. The chart at appendix E shows the civilian career progression within MWR. Almost all of the MWR key management positions and supervisory positions are civilian positions -- either appropriated or NAF.

The new integrated organization breathes new life into the Services civilian career development program and will offer new opportunities to MWR civilians. Services civilians are no longer dead ended into positions with no growth potential. Instead their career opportunities will increase. Balance between military and civilian leadership positions will be achieved as Services civilians will now have the potential to fill key supervisory positions. By dovetailing the Services civilian series into the MWR series, flexible and well defined career paths are developed. Through the interchange agreement, Services NAF employees can compete for appropriated funded positions in both MWR and Services. Finally, MWR civilians can gain experience in total community support.

Summary:

Under the integrated organization, for the first time both career fields achieve clear career paths for all employees -- thus building a stronger organizational team. Job satisfaction and room for growth are key ingredients for a highly motivated work force. Finally, quality training builds a better work team. The new organization accomplishes these items -- again strengthening the team. But the team must be focused on producing quality service and meeting the needs of their customers within a management environment which demands quality and continuous improvements to be a complete success.

## Chapter Five

### QUALITY CUSTOMER SERVICE

Quality customer service is the glue which holds a service organization together. For this integration to be considered successful, the final measure of merit is to improve the customer service of both organizations. According to the Director of the new organization, General Normand Lezy, "the core purpose of this new organization is to provide the highest quality food, lodging, recreation and membership services support to our customers. The organization provides the leadership, policies, resources, and oversight to operate life sustaining and leisure-time programs for global air power, to build high morale and to sustain air force people." (61:--) In short, it is to provide quality customer service.

Determining the "quality" of customer service and if it is "improved" is a difficult process. The framework which will be used to make this determination is one which looks at the components of customer service and the environment of the organization for making improvements. From this framework, one can assess whether or not customer service can actually improve under this organizational change.

#### Components of good customer service:

Quality customer service is the sum of many varying components which must be present to improve service. The first ingredient is leadership.

(62:--) The new organization brings renewed military leadership to the MWR career field, new horizons to the Services career field, new opportunities for the civilians, and solid growth paths for the enlisted -- equalling better leadership.

From better leadership comes good business decisions -- another necessary ingredient for improved customer service. (63:--) The key to good business decisions is quality training. (66:15) Quality training produces people who live by the laws and directives, understand who the customers are, know the needs of the customers, and build strong resource management techniques/skills. The enhanced training available under the new structure provides the needed skills for better decisions.

In a military environment, strong combat capabilities are necessary to be responsive to the needs of the wartime customer and to be able to project power around the world. (64:--) Therefore, readiness is the next key ingredient for improved customer service. Chapter three concluded that readiness is enhanced under the new organization -- providing efficient deployable teams, trained and tested, with all the needed skills to project power and sustain operations.

Finally, a strong personnel management and career development program is necessary to ensure a motivated team to work the day to day issues -- our final ingredient. (65:--) Chapter four indicated how the career paths of all members of the team (officers, enlisted, and civilians) will improve thus adding to improved customer service.

Once you bring these ingredients together, you produce quality service. You develop a team who is committed to customers and accountable to commanders. A stronger team with all the above ingredients of quality service

equals improved customer service. (67:--)

Management environment:

But a strong team is only part of the equation for improved customer service. The organization must have an atmosphere which stimulates improvement -- an environment for total quality management. Total quality management (TQM) means getting everyone involved in the improvement process with the focus on meeting customers' expectations of quality. (68:3) TQM is the perfect management style in a changing world, as the basis of TQM is continuous improvement of the processes of business toward meeting the needs of the customer. The new integrated organization gives both groups (Services and MWR) the opportunity to review the processes of each one's business with an eye toward streamlining and improved product quality.

Quality is meeting customer needs by providing competitively priced products or services determined by the customer to be fit for use. (69:3) Therefore, the first step in TQM is identifying your customers and determining their needs. (70:28) A changed organizational structure is a good time to review "who is the customer." The new MWR/SVS organization has both internal and external customers. Internally, it is responsive to Congress, OSD, the Secretariat, CSAF, Air Staff counterparts, and members of the MWR and SVS community. Externally, it supports the War CINCs, MAJCOM commanders, Line of the Air Force (active duty members, dependents, DoD civilians, and retirees) and professional societies.

Just determining who the customers are is not enough. You must know how to satisfy their needs and expectations. As an example, one customer is Congress. From the background in chapter two, it's obvious that Congress

hasn't been completely satisfied with the oversight of the MMR program at the base level. This integration provides a fresh approach to providing oversight which will ensure quality, well-trained managers who will comply with the laws, and a sustained operation. A team of functional experts, process action teams (PATs), should review each customer to determine how well the organization is meeting that customer's needs and expectations. The next step in TQM is developing an organizational culture which promotes quality as its primary value. Organizational culture is the personality of the organization -- the formal and informal beliefs, norms, and values that underlie how people in the organization behave and react to change. (71:181) Critical to this culture is for everyone to share the same vision and to strive for error prevention rather than error detection and rework. This eliminates waste, makes the organization more productive, and increases the quality. (72:A) Developing teams which focus on process improvement will provide quality.

High quality actually costs less to the organization because it is the result of doing things right the first time, while always looking to improve the way things are done. (73:4) More time is spent in the beginning of the process, however, less time is needed in the end to correct problems which normally result. As this integration begins, small groups of functional experts (PATs) should be assembled to review the various processes of each part of the business. This will be the beginning of the development of the organizational culture and error prevention.

Quality is hard to measure. Some think it's concentrating management attention on resolving customer complaints. Unfortunately, statistics show that only five per cent of unhappy customers actually complain to management.

But the ones who don't complain to management will tell ten other people about the problems they had with your organization. (74:33) Therefore, to truly improve customer service, one must focus on the customer's needs and expectations in the beginning of the process, not at the end of product development.

Teamwork among qualified, experienced, and trained managers and employees is essential in improving the process. (75:3) Continuous improvement can only happen in an environment structured toward participative management -- all working to improve the quality. (76:5) The training programs which are provided to all employees should stress participative management and to develop people who are knowledgeable of the processes. The AFIT Engineering and Services School's educational programs provided to Services' managers taught the different processes and concentrated on management and leadership training. This training will now be available to MWR as well.

#### Summary:

The new integrated MWR and Services organization has all the components for improved customer service -- leadership, readiness, personnel development, and quality training. The environment is right for reviewing the processes for improved quality and focusing on customer's expectations to increase responsiveness and service -- a Total Quality Management approach. Through TQM, improved customer service will result. The next chapter will discuss recommendations to ensure the organization provides maximum combat capability and management efficiencies.

## Chapter Six

### ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Assessments:

The data contained in the previous chapters lead to the following assessments concerning the new organizational structure for MWR and Services:

1. The chain of command was strengthened by providing the Support Group Commander with one focal point for all services activities -- life sustaining and leisure-time. The new organization has one commander, who is experienced in total community support, reporting directly to the Support Group Commander.

2. By developing flights which are focused on specific customer's needs (ie military flight towards active duty personnel and wartime requirements; membership flight towards the various association's members; youth flight towards family needs; and recreation flight towards customers looking for recreation), the organization is decentralized and empowered to be accountable to their customers.

3. Consolidating the activities identified as "possible integration points" puts the supply, training, planning, budgeting and financial portions of the business together under one manager in the Resources Management or the Plans & Force Management flights. Consolidation saves manpower and increases efficiencies.

4. The organization is streamlined by placing eleven small, individual branches into six flights each with single managers. This also facilitates



career progression as managers and employees can interchange throughout the branches.

5. Organizational lines are untangled as service policy is centralized within one service organization. The base level management can clearly see the lines of responsibility.

6. Services and MWR combat power is increased as readiness is enhanced. First, by combining the wartime requirements into one UTC, support to the Air Force's global reach global power mission is improved. Second, it provides increased training opportunities for both officers and enlisted which allows realistic wartime scenarios. The new structure also brings the two career fields closer to balance between peacetime authorizations and wartime requirements. Finally, it improves the support provided to CCNUS sustaining forces by ensuring trained managers and an available workforce.

7. All members of the new organization's team (officers, enlisted and civilians) will have opportunities for career advancement. By picking the best parts of each career path, for the first time in both organization's histories, there will be education and training programs for each segment of the business and solid career opportunities. Also, management can be assured that sufficient, well trained people will be available to meet the new corporate vision. As a result, a strong team is available to provide quality customer service to the many people which the new organization will touch.

8. Through the improvements in readiness, training, and personnel development and by implementing Total Quality Management throughout the organization, customer service will improve. The new organization has the ingredients necessary for quality service and programs. This is the perfect time for evaluating the processes to determine improvements.

### Recommendations:

But these improvements are just the start. There are many things which can be done to further enhance the integrated operation. The following recommendations are made:

1. Stop the MWR officer to civilian conversions until the number of required officer authorizations can be determined. Factor in the number of authorizations needed under the restructure as well as the reduced requirements due to base closures and realignments.

2. Establish a single AFSC for officers and enlisted. This will provide increased flexibility for the deploying commander.

3. Continue the readiness training with the engineers at Tyndall, Kadena, and Ramstein. It is difficult to train for providing wartime support unless you have an audience/customers to perform for under realistic conditions. The training sites at the three locations mentioned provide the audience and the environment for effective training.

4. Integrate Services civilians into the MWR career progression and change their series to MWR series. There has never been a good career path for Services civilians. Therefore, billeting managers should be separated from housing managers and aligned with the retail/management series of MWR. Additionally, management should utilize the MWR civilian career progression model.

5. Continue management programs with the AFIT School of Engineering and Services. Training and education is a key ingredient for quality customer service. The AFIT School of Engineering and Services has been highly successful in providing appropriate training and education in the past. With downsizing happening throughout the Air Force, the combined emphasis should

provide an adequate basis to continue the school.

6. Implement Total Quality Management (TQM) in the new organization. TQM will help formalize the vision, review customer expectations, improve the processes for providing service, and get the employees involved.

These changes will insure the new organization contributes to the Air Force's Global Reach - Global Power mission. They provide a combat capable unit which can respond worldwide. The new structure meets the requirements dictated by reduced budgets and lower manpower levels. It applies the principles of modern management by empowering people at low levels to make decisions and reduces overlap through consolidation and divestment.

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
TYPICAL  
MANNING

OFF	2
ENL	65
APF	4
NAF/CME	76
TOTAL	147

TYPICAL  
MANNING

OFF	1
ENL	11
APF	48
NAF FTE	88
TOTAL	146

# CURRENT BASE LEVEL



ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS


APPENDIX A



# ORGANIZATIONAL ALIGNMENT


	SV	MWR	PROPOSED
AIR STAFF	DIRECTOR UNDER CE	DIRECTOR UNDER CSAF	COMBINE UNDER CSAF
FOA	DIRECTOR UNDER AFESC/CC (TAFB)	STAND ALONE AFMWRA (SA)	COMBINE AS AFCSA (SA) UNDER AF/CS
MAJCOM	DIRECTOR UNDER DE	DIRECTOR UNDER DP	COMBINE UNDER CC
BASE	SQ UNDER CSG/CC	DIVISION UNDER CSG/CC	COMBINE AS SQ UNDER SPT GP/CC

# Objective Wing



# MWR and Services Squadron

## *Support Group*



# APPENDIX B

## FUNDING SOURCE

ACTIVITY	APPROPRIATED FUNDS	NON-APPROPRIATED FUNDS	MIXED FUNDS
CHILD DEVEL CENTER			X
THEATER	X		
POOLS			X
YOUTH ACTIVITIES			X
BILLETING (TDY)			X
TEMP LODGING FAC		X	
OFFICERS CLUB		X	
NCO CLUB		X	
MEMBER ASSOC		X	
PRIVATE ORGS		X	
AUDIO/PHOTO		X	
BOWLING		X	
GOLF		X	
SNACK BARS		X	
AIRMEN DINING FAC	X		
IN FLIGHT KITCHEN	X		
FLIGHT LINE FEEDING	X		
FIRE DEPT FEEDING	X		
MIL PHYS FITNESS	X		
REC CENTER	X		
TRAINING/RIBS	X		
BUDET, ACCOUNTING & REPORT			X
SUPPLY(DINING/FOOD)	X		
HUMAN RESOURCE OFFICE		X	
INFORMATION SYSTEM	X		
AUTO HOBBY SHOP			X
CRAFTS			X
WOOD SHOP			X
OUTDOOR REC			X
MORTUARY AFFAIRS	X		
OVERHEAD			X

PROGRAM/FACILITY	Saudi Arabia					United Arab Emirates					Oman		Bahrain	Egypt	Qatar	UK				
	Dahran	Jeddah	K. Muscat	K. Riyadh	R. Tabuk	Taif	K. King	K. Khalid	A. Al Ain	A. Al Dhahran	A. Al Khair	A. Al Mudda	B. Bateen	S. Sharjah	M. Muscat	S. Seeb	T. Thumrait	B. Shaik Isa	C. Cairo West	D. Doha
Rec Center/Tent	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Taped Movies/TV	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Resale/ Snack Bar	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Rec Equip Checkout	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Library/Paperbacks	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Tours	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Morale/Pay Phone	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Letter Mail Letter	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Rec Lounge/Club	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Fitness Center	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Organized Sports	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Weight Room/Tent	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Running Track	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Basketball Court	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Volleyball Court	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Softball Field	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Swimmer/Pool	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Tennis Court	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Squash/Racquetball	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Sauna	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Swimming Pool	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Beach	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Golf	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Bowling	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A

A = American facility/tent

H = Host nation facility

\* = AF facilities available to other service

\*\* = Other service facilities available to AF

## APPENDIX D

### LESSONS LEARNED

#### LESSONS LEARNED - FINANCIAL

a. **APF SUPPORT FOR MWR:** APF support for MWR was good to outstanding throughout the AOR. One of the first policy messages was 100 percent APF support for all recreational equipment and supplies, no NAF dollars were to be expended. However, some disagreements arose between MAJCOM MWR and Comptroller staffs relating to the proper funding of equipment for MWR mobility kits and other materials used by MWR programs in the AOR. One such issue concerned the appropriate fund source for purchasing snacks given to troops at recreation areas during their leisure time. It was decided to use nonappropriated funds (NAFs) to purchase resale items and consumables to be given away and to use APFs to purchase both expendable and accountable supplies and equipment. Another issue involved using 741XIs worked resale operations since there were no avenues to hire NAF employees.

Recommendation: Air Staff provide more specific guidance for funding future contingency operations and pursue remote and isolated APF funding status for all deployment/combat areas.

b. **REIMBURSEMENT FOR COST TO REPLACE DEPLOYED MWR MILITARY PERSONNEL:** Higher NAF payroll costs were experienced to replace military MWR personnel who deployed. NAF employees were hired to replace deployed personnel.

Recommendation: The Comptroller should issue guidance to permit APF reimbursement of NAF expenses where APFs are authorized for these expenses.

c. **EXPENSE REPORTING:** It would have been beneficial to establish a system to track labor, supplies and other resources directed to DESERT SHIELD/STORM support. Such a system established early in the operation would have made reporting easier.

Recommendation: SAF/FMO and AFMWRC/MWOC should develop a procedure for bases to code NAF expenses related to support for wartime/contingency operations as they are incurred.

d. **INTERNAL CONTROLS:** From the start a high priority for MWR personnel was to maintain accountability of all assets used in support of MWR. All donated property items (\$180 or more in value) were accounted for on supply CA-CRLs, surprise cash counts were conducted monthly, a single MWR fund was established at HQ CENTAF for the entire AOR, site bank accounts were set up and fund handling OIs written. If a base had financial problems they were immediately brought to the attention of the applicable commander and followed up by a site visit if warranted.

Recommendation: A financial manager should be deployed during future contingencies to provide accounting expertise and to help ensure accountability of MWR assets.

e. **FINANCIAL RELIEF:** The immediate loss of a market base compounded by increased requirements to take care of family members could create an unexpected financial burden on MWR funds.

Recommendation: The Air Staff should pursue relief from Congress for bases severely impacted by troop deployments.

f. **DONATIONS:** During ODS/DS, there was overwhelming public support and an avalanche of private donations to support the troops. These donations sent a strong signal to the troops that unlike Vietnam, the country was behind what they were doing. A problem encountered in the early weeks of Operation Desert Shield was the lack of information relating to procedures for donating items. Current regulations provide for MWR to accept donations for use in MWR related programs but not for redistribution to individuals. DLA was designated as the agency to receive donations and ship them to CENTCOM. These goods were all shipped to Dammam, Jeddah or Jubayl and transported to Riyadh where CENTAF coordinated distribution to the services. Distribution to the service components was based on a percentage of deployed population (i.e. ARCENT 56%, MARCENT 16%, NAVCENT 14%, CENTAF 14%). MAC transportation was available to distribute donated goods to the service components during Operation Desert Shield, but once hostilities started, MAC transportation was unavailable. Distribution of donations was hampered by inadequate storage facilities.

Recommendation: DASD(PS,P&E)PS,P&S should issue clear guidance on accepting donations to support wartime or contingency operations. DLA and OSD/PA should use the national news media to educate the public on the proper procedures to follow and points of contact for public donations. In the future, DLA should coordinate more closely with the supported command to establish a list of needed goods and to cut off donations when desired quantities have been received. DLA should divide the donations based on established percentages and ship them to the individual service component. Warehouse facilities should be constructed to shelter goods waiting for distribution.

g. **SECURITY OF FUNDS:** No facilities for proper security of nonappropriated funds (NAFs) were available in the early stages of the deployment. Twelve safes were eventually obtained from DRMO for funds storage.

Recommendation: Recommend a funds storage container be included as part of the mobility kit.

h. **CONTROL OF CASH AND OTHER ASSETS:** OI 176-1 was developed with the assistance of HQ TAC/DPSC. The purpose of the OI was to outline procedures for receiving, controlling, disbursing and accounting for cash and other assets during the deployment. As we progressed into this deployment we changed several aspects to ease the reporting process between USCENAF and sites. However, the OI was never updated to reflect the applicable changes.

Recommendation: OI 176-1 should be updated and incorporated into an overall Air Force or USCENAF mobility manual.

i. **MESSAGE MINIMIZE:** Autodin message traffic was suspended when the JCS minimix was imposed preventing banking, slot machine and 7404 data from being transmitted as usual. Modems were used to capture data from some bases and DDW was used to capture HQ SAC and HQ USAF data. Diskettes with slot machine and payroll data were sent by mail.

Recommendation: Incorporate alternative data communications solutions devised during Operation Desert Storm into future contingency planning.

j. CHAPEL PROGRAM FUNDING: During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm deployed chaplains made many requests to MWR for NAF support for chapel related programs IAW AFR 176-1.

Recommendation: AF/HC provide funds to support chapel functions during contingencies.

k. DISSOLUTION PROCEDURES: Dissolution procedures for base closure as outlined in AFR 176-1 and AFR 176-10 were adapted for use during redeployment.

Recommendation: Include these procedures in the MWR site operations manual.

#### LESSONS LEARNED - PERSONNEL

a. MWR PERSONNEL TASKINGS: Coordination between CENTAF Forward/DPS, CENTAF Rear/DPS and supporting MAJCOM MWR functional managers worked exceptionally well in the early stages of the operation when one agency (CENTAF Rear) prepared the tasking documents. The tasking system began to breakdown, however, after CENTAF/XPM took charge of validating manning requirements and tasked supporting commands directly through the TPFDD without coordinating with CENTAF Forward/DPS or CENTAF Rear/DPS. As a result, some MWR teams arrived in the AOR before they were needed; others reported to the wrong site causing excess manning situations and unnecessary redeployment actions.

Recommendation: In future contingency operations, the Air Component Commander should designate one supporting command staff to coordinate MWR support force personnel and equipment taskings for the duration of the contingency.

b. MOBILITY KITS: MWR mobility kit processing was a problem in the early weeks of Operation Desert Shield. Supporting commands were unfamiliar with mobility kit requirements, funding or shipping procedures. MWR mobility kit UTCs were unusable due to missing logistics detail. MWR mobility kits were shipped in a variety of containers, tri-wall boxes, wheeled metal containers, plywood boxes, solid wood boxes. Some MWR mobility kits had already been opened and some items removed prior to receipt by MWR personnel. Current items recommended by AFR 215-42 is not sufficient numbers and lacks items that are required. Most mobility kits had insufficient inventory to run a viable MWR program over 30 days.

Recommendation: More emphasis is needed to familiarize MAJCOM and base level staffs with MWR mobility kits, funding, and equipment procedures. The required number on mobility kits should be identified in the TPFDD and tasked to specific bases for support. Mobility kits should be inspected during both ORIs and UEIs. In addition, supported commands plans should tailor mobility kit contents for environmental conditions they are likely to encounter. Bases need to make sure their mobility kits can be palletized. Standardized lightweight containers with locks should be developed for MWR mobility kits. Kits should be clearly marked with the address of the designated unit/MWR and the name of the MWR POC if known. A copy of the inventory should be placed inside the kit and not on the outside of the kit. Items such as televisions, video cassette players and high value electronic games such as Nintendo machines should be shipped separately and via signature if possible.



c. **MWR CIVILIANIZATION:** Air Force MWR programs in the AOR were manned solely by military MWR personnel. Prior to ODS/DS, the Air Force decided to convert all military MWR Chiefs to civilian positions. During ODS/DS, at sites too small to warrant an officer slot, the senior MWR individual was either a SSgt or TSgt. Most commanders utilized a Personnel or Services officer to oversee their MWR operations. These sites, with the exception of one, were the ones that had the most problems with programs and internal controls resulting in numerous staff assistance visits. In addition, many commands are civilianizing enlisted AFSC 741X1 positions which if not stopped may jeopardize our capability to support contingency operations. The trend toward civilianization was highlighted during the opening weeks of Desert Shield when CENTCOM asked the JCS to task the military departments to reassess policies and plans for readiness to support MWR requirements for contingencies involving deployment of forces.

Recommendation: The Air Staff should review MWR military personnel requirements for supporting contingencies and invoke a moratorium on civilianizations if necessary to meet future requirements.

j. **CONVALESCENT HOSPITAL MWR MANNING:** During ODS/DS, a numbered Air Force requested augmentation MWR personnel for convalescent hospitals and staging areas at five different European locations. The numbered Air Force request provided no information on populations to be supported, intended hours of operation, etc. The Air Staff MWR functional manager advised the supported MAJCOM and HQ AFMPC that neither the MWR nor SG contingency planning concepts of operation included MWR manning support for convalescent hospitals. Considerable confusion existed in determining if this requirement should be handled as a Palace Trip (manning assistance) or as a Palace Blitz (wartime) requirement. As a result, numerous MWR personnel tasked to fill this requirement were placed on a "standby" status for the duration of the conflict while the validity of the requirement was investigated.

Recommendation: MWR wartime/contingency requirements should be identified in installation contingency plans and upchanneled to the MAJCOM functional manager during the deliberate planning process. Unforeseen requirements should be fully justified and coordinated with the Air Staff readiness functional manager. Manning assistance requests for main operating bases should be sized by applying Air Force Manpower Standards versus applying contingency manning guidance. Questionable manning requests must be resolved quickly and so supporting commands tasked to fill the requirement can be advised.

e. **WOMEN MWR CHIEFS IN THE AOR:** Islamic Law restrictions prevented a female MWR Chief from performing duties required of her position. This officer had to be reassigned and her position backfilled with a male replacement.

Recommendation: Local conditions that seriously hinder the ability of personnel to perform their jobs must be considered prior to deployment to SWA.

f. **HQ STAFF MANNING:** The idea of establishing a DPS directorate at USCENTAF came about as an after thought. There are no manpower requirements for a MWR staff with the exception of a M1X1 Senior NCO permanently assigned to USCENTAF/DPK. This was hardly sufficient in the case with Operation Desert Shield/Storm.

**Recommendation:** Select personnel by position as a contingent to a large deployment. These individuals should be identified and on a manning document so they can mobilize with USCENIAP. These individuals would augment rather than be permanently assigned to CENTAF. The identified contingency HQ MWR personnel should meet at least annually to discuss MWR mobility issues. Recommend the following positions grades, and AFSCs:

Director of MWR	Maj-Lt Col	7316
Financial Management	Capt	7324
	TSgt	67251
Programs	SMSgt	74191
USO Tour Director	SMSgt	74291
	MSgt *	74171
Donations	MSgt **	74171
	TSgt **	60251
	SSgt **	60251
	Sgt **	60231

\* Depending on size and length of deployment.

\*\* Applicable only if there is a DLA donation program.

#### LESSONS LEARNED - PROGRAMS

a. **LIBRARY SUPPORT:** Books stockpiled at the USAFE Library Service Center (LSC) and contained in MWR mobility kits were useful in getting library materials to SWA quickly. Using NAFs to purchase initial library materials avoided delays common to the APF procurement procedures. A large percentage of donated reading materials were not suitable for distribution within the Middle East and much library staff time was spent sorting, cleaning, packing and shipping donated books.

**Recommendations:** The supported command library service centers should continue to keep a stockpile of paperback books and audio cassettes to support contingency requirements. SAF/FM should authorize APF reimbursement for library materials purchased with NAF to support contingency operations. AFMWR/WWOPL should evaluate the effectiveness and utility of using donated library materials in future contingency operations. Recommended a large supply of boxes and other packing materials such as tape be kept available to ship contingency library materials.

b. **LIBRARY MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION:** A problem was encountered concerning unit addresses. Addresses were provided by CENTAF/DPS; however, postal personnel outside of the AOR made address changes which were incorrect.

**Recommendation:** Library materials should only be sent to addresses provided by the Supported Command DPS staff who will coordinate with Air Postal personnel to ensure proper APO numbers are provided.

c. **AAFES MOVIE SUPPORT:** Movies were provided from the AAFES Contingency Stock in Germany. VHS and 16 MM movies were provided. Three circuits for VHS and 16 MM were established to ensure movies rotated around the AOR. VHS format was the most popular and used by all locations. The 16 MM format was used by less than 45 percent of the locations. Since most of the movies were

from 1 -1 2 years old many units complained on the age of movies. They mainly were interested in current releases.

Recommendation: AAFES contingency stock be continually upgraded to ensure current movies are available.

d. VHS MOVIES: One of the most popular activities was video movies. All locations offered viewing of movies in the MWR areas and a limited checkout for private viewing. Movies were available from MWR mobility kits and from AAFES (AAFES movies were not checked out). Movies available from MWR kits were the most popular. As they were more current than AAFES movies.

Recommendation: Each MWR kit be required to maintain VHS movies. Suggest this requirement be worked in conjunction with the base library where movies could be used until deployment. Library would be responsible for continual upgrade of movies.

e. CULTURAL ORIENTATION TOURS: USCENTAF Forward and Rear AC authorized APF support to procure commercial tours for deployed personnel to see the local area and to get a feel for local customs. This assisted in preventing personnel from getting into trouble their first time downtime.

Recommendation: Continue this type of program.

f. R AND R PROGRAM (TIER 1 R&R): Tier 1 R&R programs were the individual service component responsibility. The Army and Marines used locations near their established camps where they could rotate troops in and out of a set up similar to what we had for MWR at each Air Force deployed site. The Air Force established overnight hotel stays for their Tier 1 R&R program. The cost was paid by NAF and resold to personnel for actual cost. Profit was not a motive and MWR was able to obtain discount prices due to block bookings.

Recommendation: Stay with same program.

g. R AND R PROGRAM (TIER 2 R&R): This outstanding morale program took place on the Princess Canard Luxury Liner. This liner was rented by the Army using APFs. The liner was docked on the northern tip of Bahrain and did not travel out into the Persian Gulf. The ship could accommodate 900 passengers at a time out of which the Air Force was allotted a quota of 112. Over 3000 Air Force personnel eventually participated. Each cycle lasted for four days and three nights with one day devoted to travel. Transportation to a convenient debarkation point was difficult, especially for those sites along the Red Sea. Even though meals were included at no cost and many other services were free, each visitor spent an average of \$100 utilizing the ships services which included:

Medical Clinic  
Recreational Facilities  
Swimming Pool/Sauna  
TV/Theater Movies  
Library  
Snack Bars  
Quiet Areas  
RX Retail Operations  
Photo Processing

Laundry Services  
Barber/Beauty Shop  
Book Store  
Amusement Games (not slot)  
Financial Service  
Bar Operations  
Entertainment  
Concessionaire Stands

**Recommendation:** Ensure a viable R&R program is an integral part of future deployments like Desert Shield/Storm.

**h. INTERSERVICE MWR SUPPORT:** At numerous deployed Air Force sites they were collocated with Army units. Some Air Force units allowed joint usage and others did not. Those that did had problems such as insufficient manning and equipment to handle the extensive increase in patronage.

**Recommendation:** All future deployments each service component should handle their own MWR requirements. If this is not possible, a memorandum of agreement should be drafted to ensure there is sufficient manning and equipment provided by the using service components.

**i. POLICY:** MWR policy in the early stages was written and provided by the DPS staff. During the first two months there were no regulations available to assist in establishing USCENTAF MWR policy. This resulted in making the task of establishing policy more difficult than necessary.

**Recommendation:** USCENTAF develop broad written policies that can be readily adapted during any given deployment. These and a set of MWR regulations should be included in a mobility kit for the DPS staff.

**j. USO & ENTERTAINMENT TOURS EXECUTIVE AGENT CONCEPT:** USCENTAF/DPS was appointed executive agent for all USO and entertainment tours in the AOR. We had two coordinators; SMSgt Sawyer, HQ AFMPC and SMSgt Sullivan, MacDill AFB. Both these individuals had extensive MWR entertainment experience. We provided five USO tours and one military band tour during Operation Desert Shield. Once hostilities broke out all tours were put on indefinite hold.

**Recommendation:** Continue to utilize USCENTAF/DPS as the executive agent for USO and entertainment tours. Also selection of tour coordinators should be based upon experience and rank. Rank plays an important role since they deal with senior officers in numerous staff agencies.

**k. ARMED FORCES PROFESSIONAL ENTERTAINMENT OFFICE (AFPEO):** AFPEO assisted USCENTAF with establishing the tour program and the first USO tour. There were never any clear guidelines of who was responsible for what actions. Majority of confusion was the result of poor communication between AFPEO and USCENTAF/DPS. AFPEO coordinated mostly with USCINCCENT/J1, which resulted in numerous late notifications of important information. In addition, there were numerous problems with passports except for the Bob Hope show and Gerald McRaney/Delta Burke Tour. There were also problems relating to military groups who wanted to provide similar entertainment.

**Recommendation:** One CONUS office should be dedicated as the point of contact to arrange scheduling and transportation of all entertainers including military shows and bands. The Armed Forces Professional Entertainment Office (AFPEO) should assume responsibility for scheduling and coordination of all entertainment groups touring war zones or deployment areas. AFPEO should work directly with the appointed executive agent to prevent a communication gap.

**l. USO AND ENTERTAINMENT TOUR CIRCUITS:** Three entertainment circuits were established for Operation Desert Shield in coordination with USCENTCOM and AFPEO. The principle behind the three circuits was to ensure an equitable distribution of entertainment. However, this principle was changed so that most if not all USO tours were scheduled for front line areas. These were:

Circuit I - Army, Marines, Navy, and Air Force (NE Saudi Arabia & Bahrain)

Circuit II - Air Force and Navy (West Saudi Arabia)

Circuit III - Air Force and Navy (United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman)

Recommendation: Ensure there is an equitable distribution of entertainment to all deployed personnel.

m. UNCOORDINATED SPOUSE SUPPORT EFFORTS: Programs developed to support families of deployed personnel were sometimes fragmented causing a duplication of effort between base organizations. In addition, many programs were offered without asking spouses of deployed personnel what support they needed or wanted. The end result was poor or no participation at some events.

Recommendation: Base level contingency plans should designate one base level agency to take the lead in surveying spouse support needs, coordinating base resources and organizing quality programs the people really want and need.

#### LESSONS LEARNED - TRAINING/CROSSFEED

a. JCS DEPLOYMENT EXERCISE: During JCS deployment exercises MWR personnel do not have to report their program and financial activity until completion of the exercise. Valuable training and review of procedures are lost.

Recommendation: USCENAF use these exercises for base-level training and to review procedures for reporting financial data and program activity.

b. MWR PERSONNEL TRAINING: During base mobility exercises, 741XIs are often tasked as transportation, security police, disaster preparedness and civil engineering augmentees. This resulted in many 741XIs being unfamiliar with their primary duty of setting up and operating a bare base/deployed base MWR activities. Many deployed personnel did not even have a military drivers license.

Recommendation: Bases must establish training programs to ensure 741XIs practice MWR deployment skills. Training should include setting up and operating resale, snack bar, audiovisual, library, fitness and social recreation activities.

c. SPECIAL EXPERIENCE IDENTIFIER (SEI) 325, READINESS EXPERIENCE: AFR 215-42 para 21, requires MWR Chiefs to properly document each military member with experience and training associated with readiness or contingency planning, or involvement in readiness and contingency related actions. The individuals can be assigned SEI 325 through their CBPO. Once in the personnel system, it will be easier to select personnel with the proper level of training and experience for deployment.

Recommendation: Commands should ensure personnel with ODS/DS deployment experience are identified using SEIs. SEI 325 should be refined to indicate: 1) annual chemical warfare training, weapon training, and local exercise training; 2) exercise deployment experience; and 3) actual deployment experience.

d. **MWR NAF POLICY TRAINING:** The majority of MWR site staffs ran solid financial programs but there were some misunderstanding regarding the appropriate expenditure of NAF dollars. This was a result of insufficient training and experience of MWR personnel at their home stations. Most wing commanders thought that during hostilities the rules were out the window. This made the DPS staffs' workload difficult because numerous site visits had to be comprised into a short period of time and an excessive amount of correspondence was generated to spoon feed the policies out to the sites. Some site MWR chiefs did not know how to present financial information to commander's for them to make decisions on financial spending. Our objective was to allow maximum flexibility at site level but maximum internal controls.

Recommendation: Financial training needs to be increased at all levels of command. We are not doing them any favors training them only on the program aspects of MWR.

e. **DEPLOYED SITE CROSSFEED - USCENTAF:** Informal crossfeed newsletters were used to allow MWR Chiefs to share their ideas and to clarify policy and procedures. The problem was we did not do this on a regular basis.

Recommendation: For future deployments crossfeed newsletters need to be on a regular basis and in a consistent format.

f. **MWR INFORMATION:** Some MWR Chiefs were deployed for over seven months and upon return home will have to catch up on all the changes in MWR. This will add up to a lot of extensive reading and briefings.

Recommendation: Both HQ USAF/DPHW and HQ AFMPC/DPMS need to provide USCENTAF/DPS with the same information they provide all MAJCOM directorates of MWR. Information of general use could be provided in a crossfeed newsletter to deployed MWR personnel.

g. **MWR PROCEDURAL MANUAL/GUIDE:** HQ TAC/DPSX developed an on-site mobility handbook that provided essential guidance and information to deployed MWR personnel. It included everything from local customs to how to run a pinocle tournament. What would of been beneficial was more policy guidance and procedures.

Recommendation: AF/MW ensure the commands receive a copy of the site operations guide to use as a framework for planning and carrying out future contingency operations.

h. **MWR SITE SURVEY VISITS:** During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm each site, except Cairo, received at least one site survey. Each trip was written up in a report and provided to USCENTAF/CC who directed that each wing commander be provided a copy for their review and action. This was an excellent form of crossfeed.

Recommendation: During future deployments, the supported command DPS staff should perform similar site visits.

1. **ON-SITE ORIENTATION:** After the initial deployment of personnel we had 61 recreational specialists in the AOR. It was easy to initiate recreational specialists in the AOR. It was easy to initiate policy guidance and procedures to these folks, but in the following months as we grew in number of sites and MWR manning it became difficult to get the newcomers up to speed on policy and procedures.

**Recommendation:** All new follow-on MWR site chiefs who deploy should report to the supported command/DPS prior to signing in at their site. The staff could brief the individual and provide a continuity book to bring them up to speed on AOR MWR operations.

# CIVILIAN CAREER PROGRESSION

